What Can We Learn About Human Language Abilities From The Studies Of Nonhuman Language Abilities?

Abstract

The extent to which nonhuman animals can learn actual human language is a controversial question, but many nonhuman species have acquired elements of a two-way communication system that is, and was, sophisticated plenty to enable its use in evaluating cognitive capacities. This article is a personal view of the history of these animal linguistic communication studies.

What follows is an stance slice, from someone who was nowadays and part of the field almost from its inception, who attended the relevant conferences, who experienced first-mitt the interactions between the major players and the interactions among these players, the printing, and the scientific community at large. Every bit such, information technology is a personal view of what happened; information technology is not meant to be a thorough scientific review of all the experiments, criticisms, and rebuttals, or even a thorough review of where nosotros are today. I have and acknowledge that others volition have their own memories, their own interpretations, and their ain views.

The 1960s through the mid 1970s was an incredibly exciting time to be involved in studies on beast abilities. For the first fourth dimension, the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine (1973) had been won by three ethologists—von Frisch, Lorenz, and Tinbergen. The field of psychology had been shaken upwardly past the aptly named "cerebral revolution"—the radical notion that levels and types of intelligence in nonhumans formed a continuum with those of humans (e.g., Hulse, Fowler, & Honig, 1968). These events inspired researchers to report a wide range of behavior—including communication—in various species. Griffin (1976) encouraged his colleagues by arguing that interspecies communication would exist a possible window on the minds of animals. Moreover, what came to exist known as "animal linguistic communication studies" were also in progress. Previous attempts to teach language to apes (e.g., Hayes & Nissen, 1956/1971; Kellogg, 1968) and dolphins (Lilly, 1967), using human speech, had failed. Yet, researchers had hypothesized that alternative modes of communication might prove fruitful, and were achieving some success. Different labs were using different techniques to constitute 2-mode communication with our nearest relatives—chimpanzees (R. A. Gardner & Gardner, 1969; Premack, 1971; Rumbaugh et al., 1973), an orangutan (Miles, 1978), and a gorilla (Patterson, 1978). Other labs were investigating similar abilities in nonhuman species not at all closely related to humans (e.thousand., Herman's (1980) work on dolphins). And the amazing studies on vocal learning in songbirds, showing the hit comparisons between the process of song acquisition and human being language learning (eastward.thou., Marler, 1973), inspired me to brainstorm work on training a Greyness parrot to apply referential spoken communication (Pepperberg, 1981).

Results from the dissimilar laboratories were divergent, but complementary. Use of American Sign Linguistic communication and Signed English (Gardners, Miles, Patterson) allowed for flexibility, innovation, and straight comparisons of communicative acquisition between child and ape. Use of plastic chips to stand for labels, taught via a no-fault choice procedure (Premack), provided less information about communication skills but began to elucidate how acquisition of symbolic representation could affect cognitive processing. Use of a glorified Skinner box, initially with an ape named Lana (Rumbaugh), removed most of the effects of social interaction to become at which basic concepts could be acquired via associative learning and how such learning could still allow for innovation. Herman'due south early on work ran afoul of animal rights activists, only with new subjects he had begun to show that dolphins could answer to specific cues with specific actions that demonstrated referential comprehension. My parrot started to utilise the sounds of English oral communication to identify objects, colors, and shapes. A media storm ensued (e.g., NOVA and BBC Horizon did documentaries; numerous articles were published in places similar The New York Times). Non only had we accomplished a kind of "Dr. Doolittle" moment, only we felt we could be gaining insights into how language and complex noesis might have evolved in our ancestors. If creatures separated by 300 one thousand thousand years of development and with remarkably dissimilar-looking brains could all larn some level of symbolic representation and regular ordering of those symbols, wouldn't that imply something basic in evolution? How might our ancestors have built upon such abilities?

These studies were even more exciting because they began only a decade or so after major competing theories had been proposed for how children acquired linguistic communication—Chomsky's (1959) innate Language Acquisition Device (LAD) and Skinner's (1957) tabula rasa in which conditioning played a major role. Kid developmental laboratories sprung up, gathering information to try to support one side or the other (amazingly, little research had actually previously been done), simply the implications of the studies on nonhumans were articulate: To state the case in the simplest terms possible, if Chomsky was right, no nonhuman could perhaps acquire annihilation like linguistic communication; if Skinner was correct, it was just a matter of time, free energy, try, and the correct procedure that would ensure success.

The stakes were high, and many researchers wrote scholarly articles questioning what exactly nonhumans had learned, disputing the extent of the claims being made (eastward.g., Bronowski & Bellugi, 1970; Lachman & Mister-Lachman, 1974; Lenneberg, cited in Nottebohm, 1973). These articles, and their rebuttals, started serious discussions of truly important questions: for instance, what were the actual hallmarks of linguistic communication; what might the apes', dolphins', and parrot'due south abilities tell the states almost language development and cognitive processing; what stages did children go through en route to full language; how did codes such as ASL differ from oral communication, and were these differences important? (Notation that at one point some scientists questioned if ASL was even a existent human language; a full assay hadn't been published until Stokoe, 1978.) If nada else, data from these studies spurred research on kid linguistic communication acquisition and cognitive evolution. As more was learned, the bar kept being raised for the nonhumans: One time nonhumans could use symbols to refer to objects, they needed to apply symbols for verbs, then needed to construct phrases, and also needed to use this caused code to demonstrate complex cognitive processes (categorization, relational concepts, same-different, etc.). In frustration, Fouts (1974) basically argued that language seemed to exist defined equally whatever it was that apes didn't take. Nevertheless, what our animals did larn provided important insights. Whether or not Premack's plastic chip system could be called "linguistic communication," only apes who had undergone such training seemingly could larn concepts such every bit formal analogies (Premack, 1976). Did such grooming really alter the apes' brains? Could these data provide information on how symbolic representation, cerebral processing, and brain development might accept interacted to brand changes in our ancestors en road to modern humans?

At this bespeak, however, no one had argued that problems existed with the data beingness collected. At least non until Terrace (Terrace, 1979a; Terrace et al., 1979). Terrace reported that his ape, Nim (named Nim Chimpsky, in a stab at Chomsky), learned very little after being trained in sign linguistic communication merely via the techniques of operant conditioning (Fouts, 1983). Other signing apes had been taught in ways based on those used with immature children: rich in social interaction, modeling, and referential rewards (if an ape signed something almost 10, information technology commonly received X or got to do X; due east.g., R. A. Gardner & Gardner, 1969). Terrace and colleagues (1979) argued that because his ape could not create a sentence comparable to ane used by adult, oral humans, no ape could acquire annihilation vaguely resembling homo language. Although Terrace (1979a) did raise points well-nigh methodology and information estimation that needed addressing (east.yard., the sometimes pocket-sized numbers of options from which subjects could cull the correct reply and often the small numbers of trials involved, both lowering the statistical power), he did not limit his criticisms to those points. Specifically, he compared ASL-learning chimps not with ASL-learning homo infants, but (improperly) with infants acquiring spoken English. Thus, he correctly noted that ASL strings such every bit YOU ME Consume? lacked the complexity of English syntax, but failed to admit that such strings were i manner in which homo oral sentences such equally "Wanna grab lunch?" might be expressed in sign, especially by children, and thus were, at many levels, equivalent (note B. T. Gardner & Gardner, 1998; Van Cantfort & Rimpau, 1982). He didn't accept that in a system in which one can't increment volume, emphasis occurs by perseveration (Finton & Smith, 2003; B. T. Gardner & Gardner, 1998; Hoffmeister, Moores, & Ellenberger, 1975). He acknowledged that his ape never progressed beyond simple associations between objects, a few actions, and symbols, but non that such associations are often the very showtime stages in human being label conquering (e.chiliad., Bloom, 1973). (Numerous reasons likely existed for Nim's failures, some of which might have been the huge number, ~forty, of different trainers, few of whom were good in sign; or the use of nonreferential food rewards for the conquering of nonfood signs, thus making the association betwixt sign and object less relevant; run into Terrace, 1979b). He did not accept evidence presented by other laboratories for spontaneous generation of signs ("cry hurt food" for radishes; Fouts, 1974), or concatenation of computer lexigrams ("coke that is orange" for Fanta; Rumbaugh, 1977). Terrace went even further in his 1979 articles, however, arguing that the other signing studies were no better than his, that their information were not existence analyzed appropriately, and that such studies were essentially worthless.

What could have been a series of academic arguments (come across, e.g., the exchanges between Schusterman and Herman in the belatedly 1980s, cited below), fifty-fifty resulting in collaborative efforts (e.thousand., combining the strengths and eliminating the weaknesses of the varying grooming and testing techniques to make up one's mind something about language primitives and nonhuman cerebral processing), instead devolved into full anarchy when the New York Academy of Sciences, in 1980, hosted a briefing put together by Thomas Sebeok, a noted researcher in zoosemotics, and Robert Rosenthal, who studied nonverbal communication and how expectancies influenced conclusions (Sebeok & Rosenthal, 1981). The conference not merely had scientists as speakers but also nonscientists like the "Amazing Randi," a professional magician, who demonstrated how easily people could be fooled into seeing what they wanted or expected to see. Sign language researchers were accused of cuing their apes past ostensive signals (even though apes, every bit it turns out, may have some difficulty interpreting such forms of human being activeness; see Bräuer, Kaminski, Riedel, Call, & Tomasello, 2006), and of consistently overinterpreting the animals' signs (a possibility in some instances, but not in others; see R. A. Gardner & Gardner, 1984, for controlled vocabulary tests). Scientists such equally the Rumbaughs vehemently objected to the assault, but at the time argued that simply their ain computer-based system prevented the problems the conference was addressing, thus showing little amalgamation with, or giving any support to, researchers using other techniques (Marx, 1980; Wade, 1980). They thus added to the furor sparked past Sebeok and Rosenthal, who all but called researchers in the field liars, cheats, and frauds (and actually did and so in a postconference press gathering; Wade, 1980). The briefing was covered by the media (see review for Scientific discipline; Wade, 1980), and the public brouhaha meant that authorities agencies—responsive to the blow-dorsum—fairly apace cut off the funding for all of the studies.

About all of the laboratories abandoned their studies of linguistic communication per se, but the silver lining was that most shifted to using what we called "ii-mode advice systems" to examine various forms of cerebral processing that relied on symbolic representation—for instance, studies on numerical concepts (e.chiliad., Boysen, 1993; Boysen et al., 1993; Matsuzawa, 2009; Pepperberg, 2006; Pepperberg & Carey, 2012); dominion-governed behavior, perception, and knowledge (e.grand., Herman, 1987, 1988, 2010; Herman et al., 1993; Schusterman & Gisiner, 1988, 1989; Schusterman & Krieger, 1984); relational concepts (Pepperberg & Brezinsky, 1991; Schusterman & Krieger, 1986); and symbolic equivalence (east.g., Kastak & Schusterman, 2002; Pepperberg & Gordon, 2005; Reiss & McCowan, 1993). Other researchers examined dissimilar forms of rule-governed behavior (and often social learning) that were the ground for syntax, such every bit the ordered sets of actions needed to solve puzzle boxes and how those ordered sets may be acquired (keas: Miyata, Gajdon, Huber, & Fujita, 2011; apes: Whiten, 1998; annotation Terrace, Son, & Brannon, 2003, on other forms of series learning in monkeys).

The Rumbaughs, at least for awhile, continued to examine aspects of symbolic communication, although primarily in terms of comparative cognition, studying similarities and differences betwixt bonobos and mutual chimpanzees with respect to aspects of symbolic labeling and comprehension of sentence frames (reviewed in Savage-Rumbaugh, Brakke, & Hutchins, 1992). Interestingly, this after work often specifically tested effects of social interaction, acknowledging a meaning change in methodology and interpretation. Other researchers examined receptive capacities of dogs, possibly to meet if the process of domestication had an consequence on referential learning (e.thousand., Kaminski, Phone call, & Fischer, 2004; notation Griebel & Oller, 2012) and still others worked to "crack the code" of communication in nature (e.g., monkeys: Schlenker, Chemla, Arnold, & Zuberbühler, 2016; song sparrows: Beecher & Akçay, 2014; toothed whales: Janik, Sayigh, & Wells, 2006; McCowan & Reiss, 2001). Some researchers have looked for rule-governed behavior with respect to communication systems by studying nonhumans' (particularly songbirds') understanding of artificial grammars (Beckers, Bolhuis, Okanoya, & Bewick, 2012; Gentner, Fenn, Margoliash, & Nussbaum, 2006; Fitch & Friederici 2012; x Cate & Okanoya, 2012).

Thus, although interspecies advice studies may not have taught nonhumans to use "language," nonhumans (and those who studied them) had learned quite a bit. Conspicuously, some common neural architecture enabled disparate nonhuman species to achieve a level of symbolic representation and rule-governed beliefs, suggesting that some such abilities were likely in their natural communication systems and had evolved for that purpose—it was unlikely that researchers instilled such beliefs entirely de novo. Withal, grants for such studies became more and more hard to obtain, subjects began to die off, and the next generation of students seemed more intrigued by human being neurobiology and fMRIs. And, in a somewhat unnerving plow of events, creature rights leaders began using the data obtained past researchers in the beast language/animal knowledge field to push for rules and regulations prohibiting apes and marine mammals from being available for such studies in the future.

As a effect, we are missing many opportunities. The possibilities of studying nonhumans as models for our ancestral abilities or for how convergent evolution might have led to similar language-like abilities in birds, humans, and marine mammals has significantly decreased—as is the possibility of beginning studies with other vocal learners such as elephants (note Stoeger et al., 2012). Fortunately, the field of animal cognition however has pockets of forcefulness, and questions grow: What are the differences in imitative ability (in all its complication—e.k., mimicry vs. emulation vs. faux) that might exist important for human–nonhuman advice systems and conquering of cognitive concepts (eastward.g., Nielsen, Subiaul, Galef, Zentall, & Whiten, 2012)? Given that nosotros know more than now near signed languages, their parallels to spoken languages, and how they can evolve over fourth dimension (e.grand., Goldin-Meadow et al., 2015), and more almost language pedagogy (e.g., Golinkoff, Tin, Soderstrom, & Hirsh-Pasek, 2015), how much might apes learn if trained accordingly? Given the research on using reckoner-based communication training and portable systems for children on the autistic spectrum (Ramdoss et al., 2011), where might such training take led with apes and marine mammals? Given that nosotros know more nigh human languages and are standing to learn more (e.thou., Levinson & Greyness, 2012), are the criteria we once used for nonhuman acquisition fair? With data on those fronts, not to mention knowledge of brain structures and connectivity, and the striking parallels between primate and nonprimate and fifty-fifty nonmammalian communication systems, what might nosotros exist able to deduce near the precursors to modern human languages? Might studies of avian vocal learning—with respect to possible avian "missing links," such equally bellbirds (flycatchers technically classified every bit suboscines—nonvocal learners—that nonetheless exercise acquire uncomplicated songs; Kroodsma et al., 2013)—tell united states of america, through investigations of convergent development, something about what types of brains our ancestors might have been developing? The listing can go on, and the implications are articulate.

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Department of Psychology, William James Hall, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA, 02138, United states of america

Irene M. Pepperberg

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Correspondence to Irene M. Pepperberg.

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Grooming of this commodity was supported past donors to The Alex Foundation.

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Pepperberg, I.M. Animal linguistic communication studies: What happened?. Psychon Bull Rev 24, 181–185 (2017). https://doi.org/ten.3758/s13423-016-1101-y

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